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Abstract 
We investigate systemic risk and how financial contagion propagates within the euro area 
banking system by employing the Maximum Entropy method. The study captures multiple 
snapshots of a dynamic financial network and uses counterfactual simulations to propagate 
shocks emerging from three sources of systemic risk: interbank, asset price, and sovereign 
credit risk markets. As conditions deteriorate, these channels trigger severe direct and indirect 
losses and cascades of defaults, whilst the dominance of the sovereign credit risk channel 
amplifies, as the primary source of financial contagion in the banking network. Systemic risk 
within the northern euro area banking system is less apparent, while the southern euro area 
banking system is more prone and susceptible to bank failures provoked by financial contagion. 
By modelling the contagion path the results demonstrate that the euro area banking system 
insists to be markedly vulnerable and conducive to systemic risks.  
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1. Introduction 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 was the earthquake 
displaying that the modern financial system was severely fragile. Global financial market 
participants were directly impacted by its default and numerous repercussions were felt 
throughout the world, resulting from a plethora of cross-border and cross-entity 
interdependencies (De Haas et al. 2012; Acharya et al. 2014). The shock was rapidly spread in 
Europe, where by the end of September, euro area governments rescued the Belgian-French 
bank Dexia, demonstrating vividly that these interdependencies generate amplified responses 
to shocks and increase the speed of contagion in the financial system (Panageas 2010; Acharya 
et al. 2011; Aiyar 2012, Acharya et al. 2015 inter alia). Thus, in the aftershock era, the effects 
of both interconnectedness and contagion manifested themselves and systemic risk emerged as 
one of the most challenging aspects ( Elliott et al. 2014; Acemoglu et al. 2015). The banking 
industry grappled with one overarching challenge; to measure and reduce systemic risk (for a 
definition and discussion on systemic risk and contagion see also Acharya et al. 2012; Liang 
2013; and Allen and Carletti 2013) in order to improve the resilience of the financial system to 
adverse shocks and to prevent a repetition of the recent crisis.   
While the euro area banking system was fundamentally solvent, according to several 
stress tests (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011; European Banking Authority 
2012), the contagion from the Lehman bankruptcy put at risk the stability of the European 
financial system, indicating that systemic risk has been enormously underestimated (Bartram 
et al. 2007; Engle et al. 2014). Synchronically, as contagion fears spread, the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis became apparent, and threatened the integrity of the Eurozone (Lane 
2012; Claeys and Vašíček 2014). Emphatically, a sovereign default could lead to a disastrous 
financial instability and to an unprecedented failure of the European banking system (see also 
Caballero and Simsek 2013; Gennaioli et al. 2014). 
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The intensity and the speed with which shocks propagate in the entire financial system, 
highlights the need to identify, measure and understand the nature and the source of systemic 
risk in order to improve the underlying risks that banks face, to avert banks’ liquidation ex ante 
and to promote macro-prudential policy tools (for an extensive review on macro-prudential 
policies see also Hanson et al. 2011). Thus, this study focuses on the euro area banking industry 
to examine the way systemic risk arises endogenously, the resilience of the Euro area banking 
system to systemic risk, and how shocks in economic and financial channels propagate in the 
banking sector. We also endeavour to answer the following questions: In the presence of a 
distress situation how the financial system performs? Have the new capital rules rendered the 
European banking industry safer? What is the primary source of systemic risk? How financial 
contagion propagates within the Eurozone? These fundamental themes remain unanswered, 
and hence obtaining the answers is critical and at the heart of most of the recent research on 
systemic risk. 
Motivated by the absence of empirical evidence, we address these issues drawing on 
recent developments in the studies of systemic risk, contagion channels and advances in 
network theory, by constructing a unique interconnected, dynamic and continuous-time model 
of financial networks with complete market structure3 (i.e. interbank loan market) and two 
additional independent channels of systemic risk (i.e. sovereign credit risk and asset price 
risk4). More precisely, we build on and extend the financial network models developed by Gai 
et al. (2011), Mistrulli (2011) and Castren and Rancan (2014) to employ counterfactual 
simulations with entropy maximisation and to propagate shocks across the financial network5, 
                                                          
3 As discussed in the theoretical work of Allen and Gale (2000), and Freixas et al. (2000) the interbank market 
follows a multilateral pattern of banks’ financial linkages - claims, the so called “complete market structure”. 
4 In this study, asset price risk refers to the risk of depreciating a common asset which is financed by a loan (i.e. 
asset-backed loan). 
5 Our financial network uses the claims and liabilities of banks’ balance sheets and excludes any leverage, in order 
to secure that any variation in the system is based on multiple equilibria. Shocks propagated in our model would 
penalize banks for being exposed to leverage and increase substantially their vulnerability in systemic risk and 
contagion. This approach also fulfils the criteria of Allen and Gale (2000), Shin (2008), Mistrulli (2011) and 
Castren and Rancan (2014).  
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emerged from three systemic risk channels. Thus, our methodological approach provides two 
novelties. First, the financial network in this study consists of a unique set of various sectors 
which are neglected hitherto by the international literature. Specifically, we analyse the 
complexity of the system in terms of not only the bilateral linkages but also losses and cascades 
of defaults triggered by sovereign credit risk, and asset price risk. Second, in contrast with the 
existing literature, we are able to disentangle the effects of the shock in losses generated by the 
initial shock and losses spread by contagion. More concretely, we are able to capture multiple 
snapshots of the network structure and to measure accurately the direct and indirect effects. 
Consequently, the model allows us to provide novel evidence on the type of systemic risk 
which dominates the financial system and to measure and evaluate: i) the effects of shocks on 
one or more financial institutions (e.g. total losses, solvency and bankruptcy events); ii) the 
transmission mechanism which transfers and provokes the negative effects to the rest of the 
system; and iii) the variations in financial robustness, which display the boundaries of the 
European banking system.  
Interestingly, at first glance we find that a shock in the interbank loan market causes 
the higher amount of losses in the banking network. This notwithstanding, remarkably we find 
that losses generated by the sovereign credit risk channel transmit faster through the contagion 
channel, triggering a cascade of bank failures. This shock can cause banks to stop using the 
interbank market to trade with each other and can also lead banks to liquidate their asset 
holdings in order to meet their short-term funding demands. Hence, the study provides 
empirical evidence that the Sovereign Credit Risk channel dominates systemic risks amplified 
in the euro area banking systems and hence, it is the primary source of systemic risk. Moreover, 
we evaluate the impact of reduced collateral values and provide novel evidence that asset price 
contagion can also trigger severe direct losses and defaults in the banking system.  
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In addition to the above, we provide novel evidence that systemic risk in the euro area 
banking system didn’t meaningfully decrease as it is evident that shocks in the three 
independent channels -interbank market, sovereign credit risk, asset price risk- trigger domino 
effects in the banking system. Likewise, we document a dramatic variation between northern 
and southern euro area countries in terms of their response to systemic risk. More concretely, 
there is much less systemic risk and the speed of contagion is much lower in banks based in 
the northern euro area than in banks based in the southern euro area. Furthermore, we find that 
the cross-border transmission of systemic shocks depends on the size and the degree of 
exposure of the banking sector in a foreign financial system. Particularly, the more exposed 
domestic banks are to the foreign banking systems, the greater are the systemic risks and the 
spillover effects from foreign financial shocks to the domestic banking sector. Finally, the 
results imply that the European banking industry amid the post-crisis deleverage, 
recapitalisation and the new regulatory rules, continues to be markedly vulnerable and 
conducive to systemic risks and financial contagion.  
The study contributes and extends three strands of the literature. First, there is a recently 
growing literature on the construction of financial networks with mathematical models. 
Kroszner (2007), and Allen and Carletti (2013), document that the size of the financial network 
plays an important role on the propagation of systemic risk. We update their work and offer 
novel evidence that there are marked differences in the dynamic responses to systemic-risk 
related events across national banking systems, indicating that the network structure is time-
variant. Allen et al. (2011) observe that full risk diversification is not optimal in the banking 
industry, while Battiston et al. (2012) find that the financial system can be more resilient for 
intermediate levels of risk diversification. In a similar vein, we document that even domestic 
banks with small financial exposures in a foreign banking sector may be severely affected by 
a systemic shock provoked by same.  
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Second, our study offers new insights on the critical role of endogenous complexity, 
betweenness, closeness and the importance of interconnectedness in the banking network. 
Leitner (2005), Gai et al. (2011), Billio et al. (2012), Castren and Rancan (2014), and Elliott et 
al. (2014) develop network models on monotonicity and identify the importance of complexity 
and concentration in the financial system. We extend their work demonstrating that the same 
shock would cause different losses in the banking network if emerged at different points in 
time. Importantly, we find that the propagated and the final losses differ substantially across 
the national banking systems reflecting the differences on the size, and the degree of 
interconnectedness across national banking systems. More concretely, the final losses appear 
to be lower in the post-crisis era, which may be due to cyclicality (i.e. deleverage, 
recapitalisation, new regulatory framework), but the risk of contagion remains substantially 
immense. Furthermore, we shed light on the debate for the suitability of the maximum entropy 
method on financial networks (Mistrulli 2011). Precisely, we employ several robustness checks 
by using the actual bilateral exposures in the four largest financial systems (Germany, France, 
Italy, and Spain) and compare the results with those obtained via the Maximum Entropy 
approach. On the empirical level, the findings indicate that Entropy Maximization neither over- 
nor under-estimates the bilateral exposures, while also this method is an appealing approach to 
calibrate losses generated by systemic shocks, and to measure the severity of financial 
contagion.  
Third, our study relates to the vast literature on macro-prudential policies, the nature of 
systemic risk, and the spread of contagion in the banking industry developed by Allen and Gale 
(2004), Allen et al. (2009), Co-Pierre (2013), Drehmann and Tarashev (2013), Ang and 
Longstaff (2013), among others. For instance, Allen and Gale (2004), and Allen et al. (2009) 
examine how shocks propagate through a financial network, based on interbank lending and 
model excessive price volatility. Co-Pierre (2013) compares systemic risk caused by contagion 
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with the risk triggered by common shocks whilst Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) measure the 
systemic importance of interconnected banks. Ang and Longstaff (2013) study the nature of 
systemic sovereign credit risk and observe that it is strongly related to financial market 
variables.  
To our knowledge this is the first study to explicitly compare different sources of 
systemic risk in the euro area banking industry. We provide novel evidence for the effects a 
negative shock generates by three independent systemic risk channels and document that 
contagious banks are not necessarily the large ones. The results enlighten the nature of systemic 
risk and provide a new perspective on financial contagion and domino effects in the banking 
sector. We also show that the sovereign credit risk channel is the dominant systemic risk and 
causes a plethora of defaults in the banking system. Importantly, we observe that a repetition 
of the recent financial crisis is apparent in the euro area banking system, implying that existing 
developments on macro-prudential policies fail to mitigate meaningfully the degree of systemic 
risk in the banking industry. In a similar vein, our results shed new light on the asset and 
liability management of banks. Specifically, the three systemic risk channels facilitate and 
improve the understanding of how systemic risk arises, thus providing with the optimal 
structure of both assets and liabilities, rendering the banking industry more resilient to systemic 
risk. Finally, these results have important implications for understanding systemic risk and for 
analysing policies designed to mitigate financial contagion in the euro area. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review. 
Section 3 describes the dataset, the methodology and the structure of the financial network. 
Section 4 analyses the results from the simulation of the shock propagation. Section 5 presents 
robustness checks and section 6 provides the concluding remark. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The global financial crisis of 2008 rendered systemic risk an area of escalated interest 
for researchers, whilst synchronically financial networks emerged as an appealing approach to 
study the way systemic risk propagates (see for example Elliott et al. 2014; Acemoglu et al. 
2015). Hence, over the last years, studies on credit panics and bank runs departed from the 
traditional risk diversification framework (James 1991) and examined extreme 
interconnectedness (Ongena and Smith 2000; Caballero and Simsek 2013 inter alia) and ways 
to improve the stability of the financial system during turmoil periods (Gorton and Huang 2004 
and 2006; Diamond and Rajan 2005), through financial interrelationships. A network describes 
a collection of nodes and the links between them, and thus, by using a network representation 
the structure of linkages among financial institutions (i.e. nodes) can be modelled and 
measured. Financial network theory can be instrumental in capturing risk associated 
externalities, triggered by a financial institution and the corresponding effects for the entire 
financial system. Thus, financial networks are employed as a suitable approach to study 
systemic risk, the way the banking system responds to contagion and to promote macro-
prudential policies by examining network interdependencies.  
Importantly, the financial network framework exhibits that excessive 
interconnectedness among banks and financial institutions increases systemic risk6 and may 
lead to a plethora of bank failures and defaults (see also for informative reading Bae et al. 2003; 
Acharya and Yorulmazer 2008; Brunnermeier 2008 inter alia). The recent financial turmoil 
have made clear that there is a strong need for sound empirical work in this area, in order to 
enhance regulations that prevent a local crisis from becoming global, and to examine 
                                                          
6According to the Bank for International Settlements (1994) systemic risk is the risk that the failure of a participant 
to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with a chain reaction leading to 
broader difficulties. 
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vulnerabilities that emerge from network interdependencies in the financial system. However, 
due to limited availability of data, empirical applications are hitherto at an early stage. Thus, 
entropy maximisation which calibrates systemic risk in the network structure has only recently 
served as the leading method for estimating counterparty exposures (Furfine 2003; Anand et 
al. 2014). 
 
2.2 Systemic risk and financial networks 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997 and 2002), and Kaminski and Reinhart (1999) are among 
the first to search for systemic risk in banks, prompted by changes in macroeconomic 
developments. Allen and Gale (2000) employ a theoretical approach with banks’ bilateral 
exposures in a financial network framework, to examine how the banking system responds to 
contagion. They build on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where consumers have random liquidity 
preferences, and they find that incomplete networks are more susceptible to contagion. 
Interestingly, Dasgupta (2005) examines how linkages among banks can be a source of 
contagious breakdowns, and finds the way depositors react when they receive a negative signal 
about banks’ fundamentals.  
On the search for optimal financial network the size of each national banking sector 
play a dominant role. Freixas et al. (2000) use interbank credit lines to explore liquidity shocks 
emerged from uncertainty about where consumers will withdraw funds. They find that the 
stability of the banking system depends emphatically on whether depositors choose to consume 
at the location of a bank that functions as a money center or not. Allen et al. (2009), 
Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009), and Allen et al. (2011), use bilateral exposures in the 
interbank market to observe that a strongly connected banking network mitigates systemic risk 
by transferring the proportion of losses from one bank’s portfolio to more banks through 
interbank arrangements. In a similar vein, Cocco et al. (2009), documents that interbank 
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networks are typically sparse, because interbank activity is based on relationships, while Craig 
and von Peter (2014) identify that smaller banks use a limited set of money center banks as 
intermediaries. 
An additional critical factor for the resilience of the banking network is the degree of 
interconnectedness. Allen and Gale (2004), Leitner (2005), Allen and Carletti (2006) and Gai 
and Kappadia (2010) find that banking systems respond differently in systemic risk due to 
changes on the degree of interconnectedness, idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks in 
the interbank market. In their theoretical approach, these studies account for the nature and 
scale bank-specific shocks, while also allowing asset prices to interact with balance sheets. 
Therefore, they propose central bank interventions to fix the short term interest rate and to 
provide extra liquidity in the market. Mistrulli (2011), and Trapp and Wewel (2013), observe 
not only that the network structures respond differently to the propagation of a shock, but the 
fragility of the system depends on the location in the network of the institution that was initially 
affected. Additionally, the first author simulates specific liquidity shocks in the Italian 
interbank market and observes that a bank default may spread to other banks through interbank 
linkages. 
Several studies build on the network structure proposed by Upper and Worms (2004), 
to propagate shocks within the interbank loan market. Nier et al. (2007), Gai et al. (2011), and 
Hataj and Kok (2013) employ the epidemiology approach to test the resilience of the banking 
industry to systemic risk. Particularly, they construct dynamic banking networks to investigate 
how the likelihood of the market risk depends on the market conditions and the structure of the 
banking network. They document the key role of banks’ financial linkages and observe that the 
spread of contagion depends on the degree of interconnection among banks. Furthermore, they 
find that contagion propagates within the financial network by aggregate and idiosyncratic 
shocks. 
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The network theory links balance sheets’ claims and obligations into a network 
structure. This form allows researchers to model contagion risk and bank failures triggered by 
the propagation. Similarly, Castren and Rancan (2014) undertake an entropy maximization 
approach on macroeconomic data and bilateral exposures in the interbank market, to identify 
that the effects of systemic shocks depend on the underlying network structure. More recently, 
Elliot et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) explode how a propagation of shocks in banking 
networks and the extent of interbank connectivity increase systemic failures due to contagion 
of counterparty risk.  
It is evident from the existing literature that sovereign credit risk and asset price risk 
are not examined as two important sources of systemic risk. On the contrary, freezes in the 
interbank market dominate the way researchers explore financial contagion in the banking 
sector. Departing from the financial network approach, Duffie and Singleton (1999), and Ang 
and Longstaff (2013) use the sovereign credit risk channel to propagate sovereign – specific 
credit shocks and observe that it causes a cascade of defaults in U.S. and Eurozone sovereigns. 
Additionally, Longstaff (2010), and Garratt et al. (2014), study the relationship between 
reduced collateral values and asset price contagion. They identify that defaults in the subprime 
market spread quickly through the global financial system and provide evidence for the critical 
role of asset backed securities on the transmission of the financial crisis. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We collect our dataset on a quarterly basis from the first quarter of 2005 till the fourth 
quarter of 2013 for sixteen Eurozone countries7. We obtain it from three sources: the Bank for 
                                                          
7 Our sample consists of the following euro area countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Estonia (EE), Finland 
(FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Luxembourg (LU), Malta 
(MT), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), and Spain (ES). 
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International Settlements for the cross border quarterly exposures in the interbank market, the 
total banking exposures to each foreign country and the actual exposures in Sovereign Debt 
and asset-backed loans. For instance, we have information for the exposure of Austrian banks 
not just in French Sovereign debt, and asset-backed loans to companies based in France, but 
also for loans in French banks via the interbank market.  Also, we collect data from the 
European Central Banks’ sectoral balance sheets (flow of funds) for the local bilateral banking 
exposures.  Finally, we obtain data from Bankscope on Tier 1 capital and Total Assets for 170 
Eurozone based banks (see also Appendix A for more details). 
 
3.2 The Network Structure 
The study explores the consequences from a propagation of shocks in the banking 
network in two steps. First, we construct the financial network based on the banks’ actual 
exposures in the interbank loan market, the sovereign debt (i.e. sovereign credit risk) and asset 
backed loans (i.e. asset price risk). We then propagate endogenous shocks commenced by the 
three channels described previously and measure the effects (i.e. losses) in the banking system. 
The losses are distributed into two components: the losses incurred by the initial shock and the 
losses resulting from the contagion process in order to measure the speed of the contagion. 
The structure of the network is constructed by bank balance sheet interconnections 
(nodes in the interbank network), actual bilateral exposures and banks’ exposures to sovereign 
debt and asset backed loans. For any missing information in the interbank bilateral exposures, 
we employ the entropy maximisation method with the complementary use of the RAS 
algorithm which provides the advantage of minimizing any lost information in the priors. In 
particular, the financial network is generated based on the following three steps: First, we 
consider a Eurozone based economy with n financial intermediaries (i.e. banks). These are 
initially linked with each other based on the actual and simulated exposures in the local 
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interbank market, and thus create a two-way interrelationship which is important for the spread 
of shocks within the network and for the analysis of the contagion path. Particularly, a bank is 
allowed to lend money to another bank and simultaneously the same bank may borrow money 
from a third bank. Using this structure for our network, we achieve to measure the potential 
benefits of diversification and to distinguish between losses incurred by risk sharing and losses 
incurred by risk spreading through the financial network. Consequently, we have the first 
systemic risk channel - “local interbank loan market”- represented in Figure 1, also called a 
“node” in the network structure (see also Newman 2002; and Gai et al. 2011 for informative 
reading on network structures). 
-Please Insert Figure 1 about here- 
Then, we create two additional systemic risk sources (or nodes) the “sovereign credit 
risk”, and the “asset price risk” channels. The first contains banks’ actual exposures in 
Sovereign Debt, and the second deals with banks’ actual exposures in asset-backed loans. Our 
sample contains 16 countries, and thus corresponds to 48 nodes. Finally, we use the cross-
border exposures to link and interconnect every local banking system (see also Figure 2).   
-Please Insert Figure 2 about here– 
As a result, we model the direct and the indirect effects from a systemic shock. For 
instance, assume that there is a bank based in country θ with interlinkages with a bank based 
in country ψ. During severe financial conditions, the bank in one country will be affected by 
the shock to a bank in another country. Moreover, the effects of the shock can also be spread 
via banks in a third banking system. Thus, the interdependence in the banking system over the 
network indicates that when a bank is under distress situation, may provoke a plethora of 
collapses throughout the financial network (see also Appendix B for the contagion path). Thus, 
similar to Shin (2008) and Castren and Rancan (2014) we construct an accounting framework 
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of the financial system as a network of interlinked balance sheets where one sector’s assets are 
another’s liabilities. 
 
3.3 Estimation  
Since, we have different types of nodes, our financial network is defined as 
heterogenous. In order to estimate bank-to-bank exposures in the financial network, we employ 
the maximum entropy approach, which assumes that banks spread their lending as evenly as 
possible. Following Castren and Rancan (2014), two nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 are connected through edges, 
labelled with 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , where: 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1, when there is a relationship; and 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0, when there is no relationship. 
Similarly, the link which connects two nodes is defined as xij. The links are directed, so that 
𝑥  is not symmetric (i.e. xij ≠ xji). The strength of the link depends on the size and the degree 
of interconnection. In Appendix C we analyse the positions (i.e. degree, weight, centrality, 
betweenness, closeness) of the individual nodes in relation to the overall network, and provide 
the analytical structure of the financial network.  
The bankings’ sectors financial exposures to each other can be represented by an 𝑁 𝑥 𝑁 
matrix 𝑿 where each element 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is a bilateral exposure from sector 𝑖 to sector 𝑗. This implies 
that an element 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is an asset of sector 𝑖 viz-a-viz sector 𝑗 and naturally is also a liability of 
sector 𝑗 towards sector 𝑖.   
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       (1) 
Thus a sector’s total assets are given by the sum of its row, the marginal 𝒂𝒊 above given 
by formula (2) below:  
𝑎𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 (2) 
By the same rationale a sector’s total liabilities are given by the marginal 𝒂𝒊 as in 
formula (3) below: 
𝑙𝑗 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁 
 
(3) 
We do not have information for the element 𝑥𝑖𝑗 but we do have the column and row 
marginal from the euro area accounts collected from the European Central Bank. From these 
we want to extract a set of 𝑥𝑖𝑗 consistent with the row and column totals and also a set that is 
the most possible, given the values of the vectors 𝒂𝒊 and 𝒍𝒋. However, without any further 
assumptions about 𝑥𝑖𝑗 we cannot estimate the result analytically for N>2 since N
2 – 2N 
unknowns have to be estimated.  If we make a further assumption that the data are consolidated, 
that is a sector does not borrow or lend to itself, the main diagonal (𝑥𝑖𝑗 for 𝑖 = 𝑗) becomes zero 
and we can interpret the 𝒂𝒊’s and 𝒍𝒋’s as realisations of the marginal distributions 𝑓(𝒂𝒊) and 
f(𝒍𝒋), and the x’s as their joint distribution, 𝑓(𝒂𝒊, 𝒍𝒋). If 𝑓(𝒂𝒊) and f(𝒍𝒋) are independent, then  
𝑥𝑖𝑗  =  𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒋. According to the information theory (Jaynes, 1957), this gives us the matrix 𝑿
∗. 
11 1 1 1
1
1
1
... ...j N
i ij iN i
N Nj NN N
j N
x x x a
x x x a
X
x x x a
l ll
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Now we have 𝑁2 − 3𝑁 unknowns and the problem cannot be estimated analytically for 𝑁 >
 3. 
        (4) 
Standardising we can interpret the vectors 𝒂𝒊 and 𝒍𝒋 as the marginal distributions 𝑓(𝒂𝒊)  
and 𝑓(𝒍𝒋) while the 𝑥𝑖𝑗’s are their joint distribution 𝑓(𝒂𝒊, 𝒍𝒋). Then if 𝑓(𝒂𝒊) and 𝑓(𝒍𝒋) are 
independent it follows that 𝑥𝑖𝑗  =  𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒋 (see also Upper and Worms 2004 for further reading). 
In information theory terms, this amounts to maximising the entropy of the matrix 𝑿. This 
independence assumption is consistent with each sector’s assets and liabilities being spread 
equally over the other sectors based on their total assets and liabilities.  
Of course independence is not always a good predictor of reality. There could be 
economic or political reasons why some sectors in some countries might be more exposed to 
some others. However by constructing the network of exposures with the independence 
assumption we are biasing it against contagion which would be more likely to manifest if some 
sectors were over-exposed to another infected sector. Thus if we observe significant contagion 
effects in our model we are more likely to view them in reality.  
In order to solve for the 𝑥𝑖𝑗’s we have to minimise the cross entropy of 𝑋
∗ with respect 
to a matrix with elements 𝑥𝑖𝑗  =  𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒋 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0 for 𝑖 = 𝑗. 
 
min
𝒙∗
𝒙∗′ 𝐥𝐧(𝒙∗ ⊘ 𝒙), such that 𝒙 > 𝟎 and 𝑨𝒙 = (𝒂′ 𝒍)′  (5) 
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where ⊘ refers to a Hadamard (element-wise) division; 𝒙 and 𝒙∗ are 𝑁2 − 𝑁 vectors that are 
obtained by column-stacking the off-diagonal elements of matrices 𝑿 and  𝑿∗, such that all 
elements of 𝒙 are strictly greater than zero; 𝑨 is a 2𝑁 𝑥 (𝑁2  −  𝑁) selection matrix, containing 
zeros and ones; 𝒂 is an 𝑁 −dimensional column vector that row sums of the matrix 𝑿, and 𝒍 is 
an 𝑁 −dimensional row vector that contains column sums of matrix 𝑿. Because the objective 
function is strictly concave, we will get unique solution by solving (5) iteratively via using the 
RAS algorithm.  
The RAS is an Iterative Proportional Fitting algorithm which adjusts an initial matrix 
X with row sums 𝒂𝟎 and column sums 𝒍𝟎 to a new matrix 𝑿
∗ that satisfies a new set of given 
row sums 𝒂 and 𝒍 such that 𝑿∗ = ?̂? 𝑨  ?̂? , where ?̂? and ?̂? are diagonal matrices with positive 
entries on the main diagonal. We employ it in order to achieve consistency derived from any 
missing or incomplete information between the entries in our matrix and the pre-specified row 
and column totals. Specifically, we have no information for actual bilateral exposures in the 
interbank loan market for some countries, and hence the actual linages are created through the 
RAS algorithm to guide us to a desired direction by excluding non-existent links. As a result, 
by using RAS round-by-round according to the sizes of the balance sheet linkages we reach a 
matrix where column sums and row sums are equal. Notably, the adjustments of the entries of 
the matrix are kept as close as possible to their initial values (i.e. bi-proportional), in order to 
preserve the structure of the matrix as much as possible. Hence, in order to estimate the bilateral 
exposures with the use of RAS in the new matrix X*, we minimise the cross-entropy between 
the matrix X* and the matrix X in equation, so that interbank exposures are as close as possible 
between the two matrices: 
min
?̂?𝑖𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗=1 (
?̂?𝑖𝑗
𝑥∗𝑖𝑗
)𝑁𝑖=1          (6) 
s.t. ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  and ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗 = 𝑙𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  
for: ?̂?𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and also: ?̂?𝑖𝑗 = 0 ∀ 𝑖 = 𝑗 
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4. Empirical Findings 
We simulate quarter-by-quarter three negative shocks emerged from: i) the Sovereign 
Credit Risk channel (or SCR), ii) the Interbank loan channel (or IB), and iii) the Asset Loan 
channel (or AL). We follow the mark-to-market accounting practices and assume that each 
bank has to deduct losses triggered by the shocks or to use the capital buffers when possible. 
Consequently, any losses imposed by the shocks imply a deduction in the banking sector’s 
assets, which apparently renders a corresponding loss in its equity capital inevitable. We set a 
10% shock derived from each channel and in the first step we measure the local (national) 
magnitude of the shocks. In our analysis, we are interested in examining losses and the 
contagion path occurred by the shock propagation, and thus we do not model any government 
or central bank interventions which require exogenous responses and might follow different 
rules. For instance, governments may decide to bail-out troubled banks, to force mergers 
between distress and healthy banks or to provide liquidity and funding through an asset 
purchase program with the intervention of central banks.  
We then proceed on to measure the spread of the shock originated from the banks’ 
domestic exposures, the banking systems most affected by the various shocks and hence the 
expected losses caused by the spread of the shocks across the euro area banking network. 
Hence, similar to Furfine (2003), Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Gai et al. (2011) our measure of 
systemic risk is the expected loss that the contagion channel imposes on a banking system. 
Finally, by assuming that banks cannot raise capital to compensate for the losses suffered from 
the shocks, we examine the resilience of the euro area banking sector, the way financial 
contagion propagates in the cross-border financial network, the speed of contagion and the 
ability of a local banking system to transmit cross-border systemic risks.    
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4.1 Shocks in the national banking systems  
The sovereign credit risk channel simulates a scenario wherein the value of government 
bonds decreases by 10%. This shock is then propagated through the local banking network. 
Consequently, we exhibit to measure the interplay of financial interdependence among national 
banks and the financial acceleration in the development of systemic risk. Table 1 displays the 
impact (i.e. final losses) of a 10% shock over discrete periods of time, separately for each 
national banking sector. Notably, the impact of the shock is time-variant and also, changes 
widely across the national banking systems. This may be due to cyclicality (i.e. post-crisis 
deleverage process, recapitalisation, new regulatory framework), or the difference on the size 
and the banking structure of each economy. For instance, a 10% shock (i.e. decline in the price) 
to the Austrian Government Bonds causes €3.37 bn. losses to the Austrian banking sector, 
during the pre-crisis period. The losses increase during the crisis period (€4.08 bn.) and 
decrease in the post-crisis period (€ 3.33 bn.). This pattern characterises all national banking 
systems within our sample, implying that in the post-crisis era, banks reduced their exposures 
in sovereign debt holdings. Interestingly, in northern euro area countries, the majority of the 
losses are registered in the German banking system, while for southern euro area countries they 
are apparent in the French banking system. This is not entirely surprising given the size of 
banking sectors in these countries.  
Figure 3 depicts the expected losses caused over time from a shock in the German and 
French sovereign debt accordingly. The results also indicate that a shock in the SCR channel 
triggers higher losses in the southern euro area, possibly due to the magnitude and the size of 
the Italian and Spanish sovereign debts (please see also Figure 4). It is worth noting that an 
intervention from a central bank could be at any point when the losses are propagated and can be through 
many ways. For instance, German banks can use their capital buffers to control a proportion of 
the losses. In this case the central bank will need to intervene with €3bn. in order to absorb the 
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losses propagated by the shock in the German network. Similarly, a central bank intervention 
for the French banking system would cost €4.8 bn. for the post-crisis period. 
-Please Insert Table 1 about here- 
-Please Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here- 
The interbank lending channel simulates a scenario wherein 10% of the total value of 
interbank loans will not be paid back. This shock is then propagated through the national 
banking networks. At first glance, Table 2 shows that expected losses triggered by the shock 
on interbank loans for the local banks exceed the expected losses driven by the SCR channel, 
implying that the interbank lending channel (IB) is systematically more important for the 
banking industry. Notably, the total expected losses decrease in the post-crisis period, as a 
result of the ensuing process of bank deleveraging. Furthermore, the final losses vary 
substantially across national banking systems reflecting the differences on the size of each 
interbank market. Figure 5 summarises the expected losses registered for the French (€ 63.57 
bn. in the post-crisis era) and the German (€35.04 bn. in the post-crisis era) banking systems. 
Notably, a central bank intervention will cost €30.5bn. for the French and €12bn. for the 
German banking networks respectively, for the post-crisis period. Similar to the results 
obtained from the shock in the sovereign debt market, the Italian (€23.24 bn.) and the Spanish 
(€22.56 bn.) banking sectors are affected the most compared with the rest of the countries 
incorporated in our sample (see also Figure 6).  
-Please Insert Table 2 about here- 
-Please Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here- 
Furthermore, Table 3 presents the expected losses after the propagation of a shock in 
the Asset Loan channel (AL), independently for each national banking system. More 
concretely, the asset loan channel simulates a scenario wherein the value of the collateral of 
the asset-backed loans declines by 10%. The expected losses propagated through the AL 
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channel exceed the losses propagated by the SCR channel, but are lower than the losses 
propagated by the IB channel. For instance, the total amount of losses for France is €40.22 bn. 
in the post-crisis era and for Germany is €27.24 bn. (sees also Figure 7). Consequently, the 
results demonstrate that total expected losses decline in the post crisis era, confirming that 
banks reduced their exposure to asset-backed loans. Interestingly, a central bank intervention 
will cost €27bn. for the French and €3bn. for the German banking networks respectively. Figure 
8 depicts that the same relationship holds for the effects of a shock in the Asset Loan channel 
for the Italian and the Spanish banking systems. Additionally, we find that each national 
banking system responds differently to systemic-risk related events (see also Figure 9). 
Particularly, the smaller is the banking sector, the lesser are the expected losses. From the three 
systemic risk channels, the interbank loan market constitutes the most important source of 
losses to the euro area banks. Moreover, we find that the same shock would cause different 
losses in the national banking sectors if emerged at different points in time. Interestingly, the 
results imply that euro area banks have strengthened their capital positions in the post-crisis 
era amid ongoing deleveraging. 
-Please Insert Table 3 about here- 
-Please Insert Figures 7, 8 and 9 about here- 
4.2 Propagation of Shocks in the cross-border financial network 
 Next, we quantify the effects of shocks in the cross-border financial network, in order 
to examine the extent to which local banking systems transmit the losses to the European 
banking sector. Particularly, we examine how a national shock propagates and spreads within 
the euro are banking network. Table 4 depicts total losses in the banking systems from a 10% 
shock in the three systemic risk channels of Germany (Panel A) and France (Panel B), the two 
largest economies in the euro area. Interestingly, the results imply that the interbank market 
causes the higher expected losses when compared with the Sovereign Credit Risk and the Asset 
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Loan channels. Additionally, the final losses vary substantially across the banking systems. 
Specifically, French banks suffer the wider losses due the size of its banking sector and due to 
large interconnectedness with the German financial system. Moreover, the results demonstrate 
that a 10% shock in the German systemic risk channels generates higher losses for the euro 
area banking sectors compared with a similar shock in the French channels. Thus, the German 
banking system is identified as systematically more important than the French banking system. 
The differences in the final losses are explained by the large differences on the size of the 
national banking sectors and on the degree of interconnectedness.  
-Please Insert Table 4 Panel A and B about here- 
Accordingly, the results in Table 5 suggest that a shock in the Italian economic system 
(Panel A) triggers wider losses in the euro area banking sector compared with a shock in the 
Spanish financial system (Panel B). Hence, the Italian financial system is systematically more 
important than the Spanish banking system for the euro area. The results indicate that a shock 
emerging from a given banking sector does not have the same impact than a shock propagating 
from some other banking sector. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that each of the systemic 
risk channels has a different impact on every local banking system and that the interbank risk 
channel generates the wider losses in the euro area banking network. 
-Please Insert Table 5 Panel A and B about here- 
Interestingly, a shock in a smaller banking system, like the Greek and the Portuguese 
(Table 6), originate a small amount of losses in the euro area banking systems. This can be 
explained to a great extent by the small size of their banking sectors and hence the small degree 
of interconnectedness with other European banking sectors. Consequently, we observe that the 
cross-border transmission of systemic shocks depends on the size and the degree of exposure 
of the banking sector in a foreign financial system. This result is in line with Kamber and 
Theonissen (2013) who observe that the more exposed domestic banks are to the foreign 
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economy, the greater are the spillovers from foreign financial shocks to the home economy. As 
a result, each local banking system develops different propagation dynamics in the banking 
network, due to the differences in the financial structure (i.e. different magnitude of bilateral 
exposures and different size of sovereign debt and asset backed loans). Finally, we observe that 
final losses are time-variant, since the same shock propagated at different points in time diverse 
results8. This can be explained by the changes in the network structure triggered by changes in 
the degree of interconnectedness in the euro area banking sectors.  
-Please Insert Table 6 about here- 
4.3 The path and speed of contagion within the European banking network 
 In this section we analyse how systemic shocks originated in a national banking system, 
spread in the euro area banking network resembling to financial contagion. In particular, by 
using 170 banks from 16 euro area countries, we measure the speed and the path of cross-
country financial contagion within the Eurozone. The simulation test is for a 10% propagation 
of shocks9 in the three independent contagion channels, a scenario which is reasonable under 
severe financial conditions. Consequently, this approach allows us to capture the effect of 
variations in financial robustness from one bank to the others, rather than focusing exclusively 
on default events and bankruptcies.  
Table 7 presents the results for a shock in the SCR channel and shows: i) the number 
of banks that default due to the shock and ii) the number of banks whose default cause at least 
one bank failure by contagion. The evidence indicates that financial contagion is highly 
possible to occur in the euro area banking system.  Moreover, we observe that the spread of the 
shock depends on the size of the bank that fails at the initial stage. More precisely, shocks in 
the German and French banking systems cause the wider failures. This can be explained by the 
                                                          
8 More results for the pre and post-crisis effects on banks’ losses are available upon request by the authors. 
9 Additional results with different scenarios are available upon request by the authors. 
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size of their national banking sectors and from the large number of small banks which creates 
a cascade of defaults due to their interconnectedness. Thus, interestingly we find that 
contagious banks are not necessarily the large ones. This result is in line with Mistrulli (2011). 
Notably, there exists a certain threshold (30%) for the loss rate at which the shock spreads 
across the whole euro area banking industry, thus affecting all banks through contagion. 
-Please Insert Table 7 about here- 
Table 8 depicts the effects from a 10% shock that propagates through the Asset Loan 
channel. The results imply that the defaulted banks are lessen indicating that the SCR is the 
dominant systemic risk channel and the most systematically important for the spread of 
contagion in the euro area banking systems. 
-Please Insert Table8 about here- 
Table 9 shows the effects from a 10% shock in the Interbank lending channel (IB). The 
results demonstrate that the number of defaulted banks is higher when compared with the AL 
channel, but less than the number of banks that fail due to a shock in the SCR channel. Thus, a 
closer look at the contagion path reveals that the SCR channel is the most systematically 
important source to spread contagion within the euro area financial network. 
-Please Insert Table 9 about here- 
The findings presented in this section, demonstrate vividly that the change in the 
financial stability of a bank is affected at any point in time by the financial stability of the 
counterparties. Additionally, the results imply that if some banks default, this can trigger a 
cascade of defaults resembling to financial contagion. Consequently, the default of a bank 
decreases the value of the assets of each bank in the financial network down to the point where 
the value of assets becomes smaller than the value of liabilities. Thus, the bank defaults and 
spreads the crisis to other interconnected banks. These results complement the work of Gai et 
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al. (2011) who observe that when risk sharing is maximised among counterparties, the default 
threshold hold the critical role for the spread of the shock. 
 Table 10 presents the results on how a default within the domestic banking system 
propagates in an international financial network. The most systematically important country is 
Germany and thus, we focus on the effects caused by a 10% shock in their interbank market10. 
The results obtained are based on the assumption that banks cannot react to the shock by raising 
capital while also governments and central banks cannot intervene at any stage. Indeed, whilst 
liquidity abruptly dries up when the financial system is under a distress situation, (see also 
Longstaff, 2010), central banks and governments need a sufficient amount of time to decide on 
the appropriate actions. 
Notably, we observe that a shock generated in the German banking network may cause 
severe losses and defaults in the euro area banking system. Also, we find that a bank in a foreign 
country may not be financially linked with German banks, but it is possible to suffer from 
losses or even defaults to its banking sector due to financial contagion. This result is driven by 
the systemic importance of the German banking sector which lends to the periphery, and thus 
makes contagion effects more apparent. Moreover, the degree of losses varies substantially 
across national banking systems depending on the size and the degree of their 
interconnectedness. Thus, the speed at which losses are absorbed by the banking networks 
varies across countries. Consequently, we document that the spread of a shock depends on the 
systemic importance of a banking system, and the impact of a shock of a given magnitude 
strongly depends on its initial location. Thus, the probability of default does not decrease 
monotonically with diversification in the interbank loan market, a result which corroborates 
the work of Allen et al. (2011). Interestingly, the propagation of a shock generated by other 
                                                          
10 Results for the cross-border contagion path for all other euro area countries are available upon request by the 
authors.  
26 
 
banking systems causes less contagious failures in the financial network, resembling to a non-
monotonic connectivity of contagion, similar to Gai and Kapadia (2010). Albeit, we observe 
that even small banking systems (e.g. Greece and Portugal11) have the ability to transmit 
distress in stronger banking sectors. As a result, the smaller is the banking sector, the lesser are 
the expected losses and the cross-country contagion effects. These results are in line with the 
works of Allen and Gale (2000), and Freixas et al. (2000) who find that complete markets are 
not necessarily less conductive to contagion than incomplete markets.  
In addition, from Table 10 we observe that there are marked differences in the dynamic 
responses across the national banking systems. Specifically, southern euro area banks react 
more strongly than northern euro area banks. This implies that southern euro area banks are 
more prone to financial contagion and more susceptible to systemic risks. Moreover, we find 
that as conditions deteriorate in the euro area banking system, the degree of interconnectedness 
in the financial network increases the possibility of a domino effect. Shocks generated in the 
German banking system create large losses in the financial network, and thus the domino effect 
is more apparent. This result corroborates and extends the theoretical work on endogenous 
complexity and the model of financial crises proposed by Cavallero and Simsek (2013). 
Finally, the propagation effects reveal that albeit the new regulatory framework and the 
deleveraging process, the risk of financial contagion has not substantially decreased.  
- Please Insert Table 10 about here- 
 
5. Robustness Check 
The main finding of our study is that by employing the Maximum Entropy approach 
we capture three systemic risk channels which transform risk in the euro area financial network. 
                                                          
11 More results on the way small banking systems transmit the shocks in larger banking systems are available by 
the authors upon request. 
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In order to check the sensitivity of our findings we use the actual bilateral exposures in the four 
largest banking systems (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) to compare the results with those 
obtained with Maximum Entropy. This comparison is important, since it sheds light on the 
reliability of the maximum entropy approach for assessing the interbank market vulnerability 
to financial contagion. Following Mistrulli (2011) and Castren and Rancan (2014), the 
comparison between Maximum Entropy and observed interbank patterns can be interpreted as 
the theoretical comparison proposed by Allen and Gale (2000) between complete and 
incomplete markets. 
 Figures 10 presents the results with the Maximum Entropy method and the results 
obtained with the actual bilateral exposures for the German and French banking networks. We 
observe that both (estimated and actual) lines are fairly closed to each other, implying that the 
Maximum Entropy approach neither over- nor under-estimates the bilateral exposures. Indeed, 
the black line which represents the Maximum Entropy approach12 of bilateral exposures 
produces very similar results with the actual exposures, implying that the Maximum Entropy 
approach is a suitable way to calibrate losses generated by systemic shocks.  
-Please Insert Figure 10 about here- 
Similar results are obtained for Figure 11 which depicts the Spanish and Italian banking 
systems. Specifically, the differences between the observed and the estimated values are fairly 
closed. Notably, the black line represents cross-country exposures in the interbank market, 
estimated with the use of RAS algorithm. On the other hand, the grey line represents cross-
country exposures in the interbank market, estimated with actual bilateral exposures with data 
constructed by the balance sheet items. 
-Please Insert Figure 11 about here- 
                                                          
12 The Maximum Entropy matrix of bilateral exposures contains the assumption that for each bank total 
interbank liabilities and total interbank assets are equal. 
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Moreover, we use the actual values to propagate shocks in the euro area interbank, 
sovereign and loan markets, and we observe that the estimated losses within the banking 
networks are quite similar to the estimated losses of the financial network computed with the 
Maximum Entropy approach13. In contrast to Mistrulli (2011) and in line with the work of 
Castren and Rancan (2014), this result asserts that the Maximum Entropy method does not 
underestimate the extent of the shock propagation.  
6. Conclusion 
This study models systemic risk by employing the Maximum Entropy approach for the 
euro area banking industry. We construct a unique interconnected, dynamic and continuous-
time financial network and employ counterfactual simulations to propagate systemic shocks. 
In contrast to the existing literature, we use three independent channels of systemic risk: the 
interbank loan market, the sovereign credit risk market and the asset loan market, and provide 
novel evidence on the effects of shocks on financial institutions, the speed of contagion, the 
way shocks propagate and how euro area banks respond under severe financial conditions. 
In response to the issues raised in the introduction, the findings have important 
implications for understanding systemic risk and for analysing policies designed to mitigate 
financial contagion in the euro area. Specifically, at first glance the empirical results reveal that 
a shock in the interbank loan market triggers the highest expected losses in the banking 
systems. However, by modelling the contagion path the findings reveal that a shock in the 
sovereign credit risk channel transmits faster through the banking network and leads to a 
cascade of defaults. Thus, we conclude that the sovereign credit risk channel dominates 
systemic risks amplified in the euro area financial network. Additionally, we document that the 
propagated losses vary across the national banking sectors depending on their sizes and 
interconnectiveness, while also there is a dramatic variation across northern and southern euro 
                                                          
13 Additional results on robustness checks are available upon request by the authors. 
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area countries in terms of their response to systemic risk. In particular, the speed of contagion 
and the expected bank failures are markedly more prominent in southern euro area banking 
systems. 
Moreover, by modelling the contagion path we observe that losses vary over time due 
to the post-crisis deleverage and to changes in the degree of interconnections among European 
banks. Interestingly, the findings reveal that the cross-border transmission of systemic shocks 
- and consequently the speed of contagion - depends on the size of the national banking sector, 
the initial location of the generated shock and the degree of interconnectedness. Finally, it is 
evident from the results that the European banking system remains highly vulnerable and 
conducive to financial contagion, implying that the new capital rules have not substantially 
reduced systemic risks, and hence, there is a need for additional policies in order to increase 
the resilience of the sector.  
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Appendix A. Eurozone Banks. 
The appendix below presents the sample of banks used in the study with quarterly data and the 
banks’ place of origin. Our focus is the propagation of shocks in the Interbank, Asset-Backed 
Loan and Sovereign Credit Risk channels. Analytical information for the actual exposure of 
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the banks is collected via the euro area Balance Sheet Items statistics. Notably, the propagation 
of shocks is employed for the largest banks (based on actual assets) in the euro area.  
Bank Country Bank Country 
UniCredit Bank Austria AG-Bank Austria Austria Nordea Bank Finland Plc Finland 
Steiermärkische Bank und Sparkassen AG-Bank Styria Austria Danske Bank Plc Finland 
Raiffeisen Bausparkasse GmbH-Raiffeisen Wohn Bausparen Austria Aktia Bank Plc Finland 
Landes-Hypothekenbank Tirol-Hypo Tirol Bank Austria OP Mortgage Bank Finland 
Bausparkasse der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG Austria Helsinki OP Bank Plc Finland 
Bausparkasse Wuestenrot Austria Société Générale France 
Ageas Belgium BPCE Group France 
AXA Bank Europe SA/NV Belgium BPCE SA France 
BKCP scrl Belgium Credit Mutuel (Combined - IFRS) France 
RHJ International SA Belgium Fédération du Crédit Mutuel France 
Banque CPH Belgium Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel France 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany Crédit Industriel et Commercial - CIC France 
Sparkassen-Finanzgruppen (Combined)-Sparkassen Germany HSBC France France 
DZ Bank AG-Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank Germany La Banque Postale France 
Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe Hessen-Thuringen Germany Crédit Foncier de France France 
Deutsche Postbank AG Germany 
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations-Groupe Caisse 
des Dépôts France 
FMS Wertmanagement  Anstalt Des Oeffentlichen Recht Germany Credit Mutuel Arkea France 
NRW.BANK Germany Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Ile-de-France France 
Deutsche Bank Privat-und Geschaftskunden AG Germany Crédit du Nord France 
Wüstenrot & Württembergische Germany Crédit Mutuel Nord Europe France 
Landeskreditbank Baden-Wuerttemberg - Förderbank-L-
Bank Germany Crédit Immobilier de France Développement - CIFD France 
Bausparkasse Schwäbisch Hall AG Germany Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Rhône Alpes France 
Hamburger Sparkasse AG (HASPA) Germany 
Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Provence Alpes 
Corse SA France 
HASPA Finanzholding Germany Lyonnaise de Banque France 
Dexia Kommunalbank Deutschland AG Germany 
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prévoyance Bretagne-Pays de 
Loire France 
Santander Consumer Bank AG Germany 
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Nord France-
Europe France 
BHW Bausparkasse AG Germany Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Normandie France 
Münchener Hypothekenbank eG Germany Caisse d'Epargne et de Prévoyance de Midi-Pyrénées France 
Deutsche Apotheker- und Aerztebank eG Germany Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance de Bourgogne France 
Sachsen-Finanzgruppe Germany Crédit Coopératif France 
SEB AG Germany Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Côte d'Azur France 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesellschaft) Germany 
Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance d'Auvergne et du 
Limousin France 
Sparkasse KölnBonn Germany Crédit Mutuel Océan France 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Germany Banque Palatine France 
Kreissparkasse Köln Germany Crédit Mutuel de Maine-Anjou et Basse-Normandie France 
Wüstenrot Bausparkasse AG Germany Banque populaire Lorraine Champagne France 
LFA Förderbank Bayern Germany Banque Populaire Aquitaine Centre Atlantique France 
BMW Bank GmbH Germany Banque Populaire Val de France France 
Westdeutsche ImmobilienBank AG Germany Banque Populaire des Alpes France 
Frankfurter Sparkasse Germany 
Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance du Languedoc 
Roussillon France 
InvestitionsBank Schleswig-Holstein Germany Banque Européenne du Crédit Mutuel France 
Stadtsparkasse München Germany Casden Banque Populaire France 
Wuestenrot Bank AG Pfandbriefbank Germany National Bank of Greece SA Greece 
Sparkasse Hannover Germany Piraeus Bank SA Greece 
Sparda-Bank Baden-Württemberg eG Germany Eurobank Ergasias SA Greece 
Bayerische Landesbausparkasse LBS Germany Alpha Bank AE Greece 
Stadtsparkasse Düsseldorf Germany 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of the Bank 
of Ireland Ireland 
Duesseldorfer Hypothekenbank AG Germany Allied Irish Banks plc Ireland 
Targobank AG & Co KGaA Germany Permanent TSB Plc Ireland 
Mittelbrandenburgische Sparkasse in Potsdam Germany Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank Ireland 
Die Sparkasse Bremen Germany AIB Mortgage Bank Ireland 
Nassauische Sparkasse Germany EBS Limited Ireland 
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LBS Landesbausparkasse Baden- Württemberg Germany ICS Building Society Ireland 
Sparkasse Pforzheim Calw Germany Credito Emiliano Holding Italy 
LBS Westdeutsche Landesbausparkasse Germany Casse del Tirreno Italy 
InvestitionsBank des Landes Brandenburg Germany Bank Sepah Italy 
Berliner Volksbank eG Germany Espirito Santo Financial Group S.A. Luxembourg 
Kreissparkasse Ludwigsburg Germany Standard International Holdings S.A. Luxembourg 
Kreissparkasse Muenchen Starnberg Ebersberg Germany KBL European Private Bankers SA Luxembourg 
Sparkasse Nürnberg Germany Jsc Latvian Development Financial Institution Altum Latvia 
Sparda-Bank Südwest eG Germany GE Capital Latvia Latvia 
Investitions- und Strukturbank Rheinland-Pfalz (ISB) GmbH Germany Caixa Geral de Depositos Portugal 
Debeka Bausparkasse AG, Sitz Koblenz am Rhein Germany Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp Portugal 
Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG Germany Banco Espirito Santo SA Portugal 
Sparkasse Leipzig Germany Banco BPI SA Portugal 
Sparkasse Münsterland Ost Germany Santander Totta SGPS Portugal 
Bank für Sozialwirtschaft Aktiengesellschaft Germany Banco Santander Totta SA Portugal 
Sparda-Bank West eG Germany Caixa Economica Montepio Geral Portugal 
Landessparkasse zu Oldenburg Germany BANIF - Banco Internacional do Funchal, SA Portugal 
Frankfurter Volksbank eG Germany Banco Popular Portugal SA Portugal 
Kreissparkasse Esslingen Nuertingen Germany Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. Slovakia 
Sparkasse Krefeld Germany Tatra Banka a.s. Slovakia 
Bethmann Bank Germany Sberbank Slovensko, as Slovakia 
Saechsische AufbauBank Forderbank Germany Prima banka Slovensko a.s. Slovakia 
Stadtsparkasse Essen-Sparkasse Essen Germany Banka Celje dd Slovakia 
BBBank eG Germany Banka Koper d.d. Slovenia 
LBS Norddeutsche Landesbausparkasse Berlin-Hannover Germany Banka Celje dd Slovenia 
Sparkasse Dortmund Germany Gorenjska Banka d.d. Kranj Slovenia 
DNB Pank AS Estonia Postna Banka Slovenije dd Slovenia 
AS LHV Pank Estonia   
Fund KredEx Estonia   
Tallinn Business Bank Ltd-Tallinna Äripanga AS Estonia   
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain   
Ibercaja Banco SAU Spain   
Catalunya Banc SA Spain   
Kutxabank SA Spain   
Liberbank SA Spain   
Caja Laboral Popular Coop de credito Spain   
Barclays Bank S.A. Spain   
Banco Grupo Cajatres SA-Caja 3 Spain   
Caja Rural De Castilla-La Mancha Spain   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Modelling Financial Contagion 
We model contagion stemming from unexpected shocks in our financial network, with 
banks’ balance sheets14 being the conduits for the transmission of the shocks as losses 
                                                          
14 We follow the mark-to-market accounting practices and assume that each bank has to deduct losses triggered 
by the shocks or to use the capital buffers when possible. Consequently, any losses imposed by the shocks imply 
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propagate through the banking system. The simulations are employed quarter-by-quarter 
between the first quarter of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2013. Specifically, we consider 
sixteen Eurozone based countries, each with an economic system formed by N banks. We 
consider a credit cycle which lasts for four dates (t = 0, 1, 2, 3). At the initial date (i.e. t = 0), 
each bank i holds sufficient capital that it can either lend it to other banks via the interbank loan 
channel (𝑁𝑖
𝐼𝐵) and/or invest in Government Bonds (𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐵) via the Sovereign Credit Risk 
channel, and/or invest in asset-backed loans (𝑁𝑖
𝐴𝐿) via the Asset Loan Risk channel. All 
projects described above, provide a sufficient profit if held to maturity, i.e. at t = 3. However, 
the bank has the choice to liquidate its project (fully or partially) at t = 2, but will only recover 
a fraction of the project’s full value.  
We propagate shocks triggered by each channel independently at time t  = 1. Then, we 
measure the losses realised for banks emanated from the shocks in each channel. Every bank 
has to meet interbank liabilities (𝐿𝑖
𝐼𝐵) and thus, losses incurred by a shock in a channel (e.g. the 
asset loan risk channel 𝑁𝑖
𝐴𝐿) can be recovered by liquidating other projects (e.g. the Sovereign 
Debt holdings  𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐵), at time t = 2.  Consequently, systemic shocks in one channel may trigger 
fire sales, and hence losses in other channels. Thus, our approach allows us to distinguish 
between losses incurred by the propagation of a shock and losses incurred by contagion and 
the spread of systemic risk.  
As a result, if there is a shock in the interbank loan channel, a bank i is solvent when: 
(1 − 𝜎)𝑁𝑖
𝐼𝐵 + 𝑞𝑆𝐵𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐵 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑁𝑖
𝐴𝐿 − 𝐿𝑖
𝐼𝐵 >CR      (1) 
where σ is the fraction of banks with obligations to bank i that have suffered losses from the 
shock, 𝑞𝑆𝐵 is the resale price of the Sovereign Bond, 𝑞𝐴𝐿is the resale price of the asset-backed 
loan, and CR is the bank’s tier-1 capital. Moreover, the values of 𝑞𝑆𝐵 and 𝑞𝐴𝐿 are always less 
                                                          
a deduction in the banking sector’s assets, which apparently renders a corresponding loss in its equity capital 
inevitable.  
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than one in the event of asset sales, since there are fire sales with the propagation of the shock 
in order  a bank to meet its liabilities. 
As a result, when 𝜎 > 𝐶𝑅 + 𝑁𝑖
𝐼𝐵, a bank has to liquidate other projects in order to be 
solvent: 
𝜎 <
𝛫𝑖−(1−𝑞𝑆𝐵)𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐵−(1−𝑞𝐴𝐿)𝑁𝑖
𝐴𝐿
𝑁𝑖
𝐼𝐵 , for 𝑁𝑖
𝐼𝐵 ≠ 0.       (2) 
where 𝛫𝜄 = 𝑁𝑖
𝛪𝛣 + 𝑁𝑖
𝐵𝑆 + 𝑁𝑖
𝐴𝐿 − 𝐶𝑅 is the bank’s capital buffer which can be used in order to 
meet its liabilities.  
All banks are allowed to fail one at a time, if the amount of the losses is greater than 
lenders’ reported tier-1 capital (i.e. capital + reserves). Finally, we calculate the losses triggered 
in other banking systems from the initial shock. Notably, in this study we are interested in 
examining the effects of systemic risks in the euro area banking network and the resilience of 
the banking system. Thus, our financial network does not allow for a role of the central bank 
or for any government interventions in providing liquidity or rescue packages to the distressed 
banks which require exogenous responses and might follow different rules.  
Thus, a bank is insolvent in our financial network when: 
𝜎 >
𝛫𝑖−(1−𝑞𝑆𝐵)𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐵−(1−𝑞𝐴𝐿)𝑁𝑖
𝐴𝐿
𝑁𝑖
𝐼𝐵 , for 𝑁𝑖
𝐼𝐵 ≠ 0.      (3) 
Contagion occurs in the network system when either a bank is insolvent (equation (3)) 
or when fire sales - triggered by the propagation of a shock – are spread to other banks. 
Therefore, the likelihood of contagion corresponds and is directly linked to the size of the bank, 
the size of losses, the degree of interconnectedness and the size of the capital buffer. 
The same relationship holds when the shock is propagated through the Asset Loan 
Channel. However, a shock propagated within the Sovereign Debt channel implies that the 
interbank loan and the asset backed securities markets are illiquid, because sovereign debt 
represents economic performance and credit conditions for a country and thus a priori liquidity 
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will freeze in the interbank market while synchronically the price of collaterals will be severely 
harmed. Hence, amid to the direct interlinkages and obligations, the possibility of indirect 
financial contagion increases significantly when the shocks are triggered by the sovereign debt 
risk channel, such that equation (3) becomes:  
𝜎 >
𝛫𝑖
𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐵, for 𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐵 ≠ 0         (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C. Network Measures 
In order to take into account the information provided by the Maximum Entropy 
method, we identify the appropriate quantities characterising the structure and organisation of 
our network at the statistical level. The appendix provides a general characterisation of the 
heterogenous statistical properties presents the number of sector-level nodes, the estimated 
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degree, closeness, centrality, and the clustering coefficient. Degree is the sum of the direct links 
that each node has with other nodes. With closeness we capture the influence for each node. 
With centrality and betweenness we clarify the absolute position of the node in the banking 
network.  The clustering coefficient (CC) shows for a given node, the number of actual links 
to other nodes. 
Statistical properties of the Banking Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The graph presents the network structure for the Interbank Loan Market cross-banking exposures. The 
nodes are the Banking Sectors (i.e. BS) for each euro area country. The links are the actual exposures from the 
Bank of International Settlements statistics and the different strength of the arrows and the links represents the 
different volumes (sizes) and the difference in the degree of interconnections for the bilateral interlinkages. The 
domestic interbank exposures are estimated with the maximum entropy method.   
Network Measures 
Nodes            48 
Degree 1.54 
CC 0.42 
KIN  - KOUT  107,491 
𝐶𝐶
𝑊  2.79 
𝐶𝐵
𝑊 2.36 
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Figure 2. The graph depicts the network structure for the Asset-backed Loans (AL) and Sovereign Credit Risk 
(SCR) exposures. The nodes reflect actual exposures of each national banking sector. Each line represents the 
country from which the shock emerges. The strength of each link and each arrow exhibits the different volumes 
and the difference in the degree of interconnections for the bilateral interlinkages. 
 
Figure 3. The graphs present losses in the German and French Banking Systems generated from a 10% negative 
shock in their Sovereign Debt Markets (Sovereign Credit Risk Channel). The simulation tests are propagated 
quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 2013. 
 Losses in the German Banking Sector   Losses in the French Banking Sector 
                                     
 
 
 
Figure 4. The graphs exhibit losses in the Italian and Spanish Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
their Sovereign Debt markets (Sovereign Credit Risk Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-
quarter from 2005 till 2013. 
 Losses in the Italian Banking Sector   Losses in the Spanish Banking Sector 
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Figure 5. The graphs present losses in the German and French Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
their national Interbank Loan markets. The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 2013.   
Losses in the German Banking Sector   Losses in the French Banking Sector  
                             
Figure 6. The graphs exhibit losses in the Italian and Spanish Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
their national Interbank Loan markets. The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 2013.    
Losses in the Italian Banking Sector   Losses in the Spanish Banking Sector 
                                       
Figure 7. The graphs present losses in the German and French Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
the German and French Asset-Backed Loans (Asset Loan Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-
by-quarter from 2005 till 2013.   
 Losses in the German Banking Sector   Losses in the French Banking Sector 
                                  
Figure 8. The graphs exhibit losses in the Italian and Spanish Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
the Asset-Backed Loans (Asset Loan Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-quarter from 2005 
till 2013.   
 Losses in the Italian Banking Sector         Losses in the Spanish Banking Sector 
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Figure 9. Total losses emerged in national banking systems from 10% negative shocks in three systemic risk 
channel. Panel A presents losses triggered in the Northern Euro Area banking sectors and Panel B exhibits losses 
caused in the Southern Euro Area banking sectors. The amounts are in EUR billions. 
PANEL A      PANEL B   
 
Figure 10. Losses estimated with Entropy Maximisation (estimate line) and losses generated by actual bilateral  
Exposures (actual line) from a 5% negative shock in the German (Panel A) and the French (Panel B) Banking 
Systems. The results are estimated quarter-by-quarter and the amounts are in EUR billions. 
  PANEL A     PANEL B   
 
Figure 11. Losses estimated with Entropy Maximisation (estimate line) and losses generated by actual bilateral  
Exposures (actual line) from a 10% negative shock in the Italian (Panel A) and the Spanish (Panel B) Banking 
Systems. The results are estimated quarter-by-quarter and the amounts are in EUR billions. 
  PANEL A     PANEL B   
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Impact of a 10% shock in the Sovereign Credit Risk Channel. The table depicts the losses of a shock in the national 
banking sectors for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods, quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 2013. 
European countries are divided in two regions: Northern Europe and Southern Europe in order to reflect the effects 
based on the geographical region. All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
Northern Euro Area Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis 
Austria -        3.377 -        4.089 -        3.336 
Belgium -        3.128 -        3.788 -        3.090 
Estonia -        0.025 -        0.031 -        0.025 
Finland -        1.504 -        1.821 -        1.485 
Germany -      29.201 -      31.880 -      26.003 
Ireland -        1.615 -        1.956 -        1.596 
Latvia -        0.087 -        0.105 -        0.086 
Luxembourg -        0.050 -        0.060 -        0.049 
Slovakia -        0.412 -        0.498 -        0.407 
Southern Euro Area 
   
France -      32.354 -      35.247 -      27.820 
Greece -        3.086 -        3.847 -        3.036 
Italy -      23.217 -      28.944 -      22.845 
Malta -        0.107 -        0.133 -        0.105 
Portugal -        2.485 -        3.098 -        2.445 
Spain -      14.447 -      18.011 -      14.215 
Slovenia -        0.299 -        0.363 -        0.296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Impact of a 10% shock in the Interbank Loan Market. The table exhibits the losses of a shock in the national banking 
sectors for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods, quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 2013. European 
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countries are divided in two regions: Northern Europe and Southern Europe in order to reflect the effects based on 
the geographical region. All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
Northern Euro Area Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis 
Austria -        8.762 -        9.566 -        7.803 
Belgium -        6.518 -        7.116 -        5.804 
Estonia -        0.193 -        0.211 -        0.172 
Finland -        4.787 -        5.227 -        4.263 
Germany -        39.36 -        42.97 -      35.047 
Ireland -        9.918 -      10.828 -        8.832 
Latvia -        0.203 -        0.221 -        0.180 
Luxembourg -        3.357 -        3.665 -        2.989 
Slovakia -        0.384 -        0.419 -        0.342 
Southern Euro Area    
France -      73.933 -      80.545 -      63.571 
Greece -        2.350 -        2.560 -        2.020 
Italy -      27.035 -      29.453 -      23.246 
Malta -        0.775 -        0.844 -        0.666 
Portugal -        4.052 -        4.415 -        3.484 
Spain -      26.245 -      28.592 -      22.567 
Slovenia -        0.336 -        0.366 -        0.288 
 
Table 3  
Impact of a 10% shock in the Asset-Backed Loan Channel. The table depicts the losses of a shock in the 
national banking sectors for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods, quarter-by-quarter from 
2005 till 2013. European countries are divided in two regions: Northern Europe and Southern Europe in 
order to reflect the effects based on the geographical region. All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
Northern Euro Area Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis 
Austria -        5.331 -        5.820 -        4.747 
Belgium -        7.531 -        8.222 -        6.706 
Estonia -        0.180 -        0.197 -        0.160 
Finland -        3.435 -        3.750 -        3.059 
Germany -        30.59 -        33.40 -      27.241 
Ireland -      10.975 -      11.982 -        9.773 
Latvia -        0.130 -        0.141 -        0.115 
Luxembourg -      10.698 -      11.679 -        9.526 
Slovakia -        0.319 -        0.348 -        0.284 
Southern Euro Area    
France -      46.784 -      50.967 -      40.227 
Greece -        1.367 -        1.490 -        1.176 
Italy -      16.545 -      18.025 -      14.226 
Malta -        0.305 -        0.332 -        0.262 
Portugal -        2.733 -        2.978 -        2.350 
Spain -      15.677 -      17.078 -      13.479 
Slovenia -        0.256 -        0.279 -        0.220 
  
 
Table 4   
Panel A Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact 
of a 10% shock triggered by the three German Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), 
Interbank loan Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions.  
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Germany SCR IB AL 
France -    0.564 -    3.209 -    2.049 
Italy -    0.404 -    2.298 -    1.467 
Spain -    0.134 -    0.759 -    0.485 
Belgium -    0.029 -    0.162 -    0.104 
Austria -    0.130 -    0.736 -    0.470 
Greece -    0.007 -    0.042 -    0.027 
Finland -    0.015 -    0.086 -    0.055 
Portugal -    0.009 -    0.051 -    0.032 
Ireland -    0.010 -    0.058 -    0.037 
Slovakia -    0.036 -    0.203 -    0.130 
Slovenia -    0.043 -    0.243 -    0.155 
Luxembourg -    0.032 -    0.184 -    0.117 
Latvia -    0.062 -    0.353 -    0.225 
Estonia -    0.064 -    0.361 -    0.231 
Malta -    0.121 -    0.686 -    0.438 
Total Losses -    1.660 -    9.433 -    6.023 
 
 
 
Table 4   
Panel B Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three French Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
France SCR IB AL 
Germany -0.202 -2.491 -1.352 
Italy -0.041 -0.501 -0.272 
Spain -    0.043 -    0.532 -    0.289 
Belgium -    0.028 -    0.351 -    0.190 
Austria -    0.029 -    0.352 -    0.191 
Greece -    0.003 -    0.036 -    0.019 
Finland -    0.008 -    0.096 -    0.052 
Portugal -    0.009 -    0.112 -    0.061 
Ireland -    0.012 -    0.143 -    0.078 
Slovakia -    0.018 -    0.218 -    0.118 
Slovenia -    0.021 -    0.260 -    0.141 
Luxembourg -    0.016 -    0.197 -    0.107 
Latvia -    0.031 -    0.378 -    0.205 
Estonia -    0.031 -    0.387 -    0.210 
Malta -    0.060 -    0.735 -    0.399 
Total Losses -    0.551 -    6.789 -    3.686 
  
 
 
Table 5   
Panel A Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Italian Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
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Italy SCR IB AL 
Germany -    0.301 -    1.536 -    0.689 
France -    1.116 -    5.692 -    2.554 
Spain -    0.081 -    0.411 -    0.184 
Belgium -    0.027 -    0.136 -    0.061 
Austria -    0.057 -    0.292 -    0.131 
Greece -    0.020 -    0.103 -    0.046 
Finland -    0.045 -    0.229 -    0.103 
Portugal -    0.013 -    0.068 -    0.031 
Ireland -    0.009 -    0.045 -    0.020 
Slovakia -    0.024 -    0.124 -    0.055 
Slovenia -    0.029 -    0.148 -    0.066 
Luxembourg -    0.022 -    0.111 -    0.050 
Latvia -    0.042 -    0.214 -    0.096 
Estonia -    0.043 -    0.219 -    0.098 
Malta -    0.082 -    0.416 -    0.187 
Total Losses -    1.911 -    9.743 -    4.372 
 
 
 
 
Table 5   
Panel B Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Italian Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions.  
Spain SCR IB AL 
Germany -    0.118 -    1.431 -    0.721 
France -    0.162 -    1.975 -    0.996 
Italy -    0.019 -    0.236 -    0.119 
Belgium -    0.012 -    0.145 -    0.073 
Austria -    0.009 -    0.104 -    0.053 
Greece -    0.007 -    0.087 -    0.044 
Finland -    0.016 -    0.191 -    0.096 
Portugal -    0.021 -    0.261 -    0.132 
Ireland -    0.005 -    0.061 -    0.031 
Slovakia -    0.008 -    0.102 -    0.051 
Slovenia -    0.010 -    0.122 -    0.061 
Luxembourg -    0.008 -    0.092 -    0.046 
Latvia -    0.015 -    0.177 -    0.089 
Estonia -    0.015 -    0.181 -    0.091 
Malta -    0.028 -    0.344 -    0.173 
Total Losses -    0.453 -    5.510 -    2.778 
 
 
 
Table 6   
Panel A Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Portuguese Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank 
loan Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
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Portugal SCR IB AL 
Germany -    0.018 -    0.188 -    0.118 
France -    0.018 -    0.193 -    0.121 
Italy -    0.002 -    0.020 -    0.012 
Spain -    0.059 -    0.630 -    0.396 
Belgium -    0.005 -    0.050 -    0.031 
Austria -    0.003 -    0.028 -    0.018 
Greece -    0.003 -    0.030 -    0.019 
Finland -    0.006 -    0.065 -    0.041 
Ireland -    0.006 -    0.065 -    0.040 
Slovakia -    0.003 -    0.035 -    0.022 
Slovenia -    0.004 -    0.041 -    0.026 
Luxembourg -    0.003 -    0.031 -    0.020 
Latvia -    0.006 -    0.060 -    0.038 
Estonia -    0.006 -    0.061 -    0.038 
Malta -    0.011 -    0.117 -    0.073 
Total Losses -    0.151 -    1.613 -    1.013 
  
 
Table 6   
Panel B Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Greek Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
Greece SCR IB AL 
Germany -    0.002 -    0.070 -    0.037 
France -    0.001 -    0.025 -    0.013 
Italy -    0.000 -    0.010 -    0.005 
Spain -    0.001 -    0.021 -    0.011 
Belgium -    0.001 -    0.019 -    0.010 
Austria -    0.001 -    0.028 -    0.014 
Finland -    0.001 -    0.025 -    0.013 
Portugal -    0.001 -    0.018 -    0.010 
Ireland -    0.001 -    0.025 -    0.013 
Slovakia -    0.000 -    0.013 -    0.007 
Slovenia -    0.001 -    0.016 -    0.008 
Luxembourg -    0.000 -    0.012 -    0.006 
Latvia -    0.001 -    0.023 -    0.012 
Estonia -    0.001 -    0.023 -    0.012 
Malta -    0.001 -    0.044 -    0.023 
Total Losses -    0.012 -    0.372 -    0.194 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Bank defaults caused by the Sovereign Credit Risk channel. The table presents bank-failures generated 
by a 10% negative shock at the Sovereign Credit Risk channel and by banks whose default triggers a bank 
failure from the propagation of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital 
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buffers for each banking system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater 
than 0.1. 
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses                         Banks failing by Contagion   
Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks 
Austria 2 0 4 1 
Belgium 2 0 4 1 
Estonia 1 0 4 1 
Finland 2 0 4 1 
France 10 0 19 2 
Germany 21 0 29 1 
Greece 1 1 4 4 
Ireland 2 0 5 1 
Italy 2 0 3 1 
Latvia 2 2 2 2 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 4 0 8 2 
Slovakia 3 0 5 1 
Slovenia 1 0 4 3 
Spain 2 0 6 1 
 
Table 8 
Bank defaults prompted by the Asset-backed Loan channel. The table exhibits bank-failures generated by a 
10% negative shock at the Asset-backed Loan channel and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure 
from the propagation of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers 
for each banking system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1. 
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion  
 
Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks 
Austria 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 1 0 1 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 
Finland 1 0 1 0 
France 2 0 6 0 
Germany 3 0 9 0 
Greece 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 1 1 2 2 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 1 0 0 0 
Slovakia 1 0 0 0 
Slovenia 1 0 1 0 
Spain 1 0 2 0 
 
 
Table 9 
Bank defaults provoked by the Interbank Loan Market. The table exhibits bank-failures generated by a 10% 
negative shock at the Interbank Loan Market channel and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure from 
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the propagation of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers for each 
banking system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1.      
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion   
Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks 
Austria 1 0 3 1 
Belgium 2 0 4 1 
Estonia 1 0 4 1 
Finland 1 0 2 0 
France 6 0 11 0 
Germany 13 0 17 0 
Greece 1 1 1 1 
Ireland 1 0 2 0 
Italy 1 0 2 0 
Latvia 2 2 2 2 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 2 0 6 0 
Slovakia 1 0 3 0 
Slovenia 1 0 4 3 
Spain 1 0 3 0 
 
Table 10 
Cross-border Euro Area bank defaults provoked  by a 10% negative shock in the German Interbank Loan 
Market. The table displays bank-failures in the Euro Area, generated by a 10% negative shock at the German 
Interbank Loan Market and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure from the propagation of financial 
contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers for each banking system, while most 
of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1. 
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion  
 
Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks 
Austria 3 0 5 1 
Belgium 4 1 4 1 
Estonia 2 0 4 1 
Finland 2 0 4 1 
France 14 0 21 3 
Greece 4 0 7 2 
Ireland 3 1 3 1 
Italy 2 2 2 2 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 
Malta 6 0 9 3 
Portugal 5 1 5 1 
Slovakia 4 3 4 3 
Slovenia 6 1 7 2 
Spain 3 0 5 1 
 
